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100 1 intRoDuction
Business investment in many advanced OECD countries has been weak following 
the 2007/08 financial and economic crisis. This is mostly due to the cyclical effects 
of weak domestic and foreign demand (the accelerator effect) (Lewis et al., 2014; 
OECD, 2016). Other factors include funding constraints, increased macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and lower business confidence (Millar and Sutherland, 2016). 
Other structural factors may have also contributed to this trend of decline. In the 
longer run, weak investment can have a negative impact on potential growth. 
Policies should seek to give a boost to investment to prevent permanently lower 
levels of investment and economic growth. This short note overviews some of the 
important policy areas capable of helping to underpin business investment.
2  betteR access to finance is an impoRtant DRiveR  
of investment
It is well understood that good access to finance raises business investment. 
Financial constraints arise from two sources. First, in countries dominated by 
bank finance, difficulties in accessing bank loans may penalise small and medium 
sized firms. This may arise because of weaknesses on the asset side and higher 
borrowing costs, which can be aggravated by high non-performing loans in the 
banking sector. Small businesses may face credit rationing as a result of asym-
metric information problems, given that they have limited collateral. In part, credit 
rationing may be explained by lending conditions having been too lenient during 
the pre-crisis period (Millar and Sutherland, 2016). 
Improving the banking sector’s efficiency would go a long way to improving 
access to bank lending. In a number of countries, non-performing loans act as a 
drag on bank lending. Regulators should help reduce non-performing loans in 
banks’ balance sheets, increase the securitisation of SME debt and introduce cred-
it registry to limit problems related to asymmetric information. Second, deeper 
equity markets would help channel capital to small and innovative new businesses 
as they may help bring together high-risk firms with risk-loving investors. For 
instance, simplifying equity listing would increase the attractiveness of stock 
markets (Pisu, 2017). Venture capital funding plays a minor role in most OECD 
countries. One important reason for the domination of bank (and debt) finance 
over equity finance is the favourable tax treatment of debt. Reducing the tax bias 
towards debt financing through tighter limits on interest deductibility and tax 
allowances for corporate equity would help re-establish tax neutrality.
3  compleX coRpoRate income taX systems coupleD  
With hiGh Rates may penalise investment
There is consensus that higher corporate tax rates have a negative impact on busi-
ness investment via increasing the cost of capital (Sorbe and Johansson, 2016). 
Large firms benefit more from tax reductions and exemptions whereas small and 
young firms are less concerned, as they are generally not very profitable (Arnold, 
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101a 5 percentage point increase in the effective marginal corporate tax rate would 
lower investment on average across industries by about 5% in the long term. But 
this effect would be nearly 50% lower in industries with a high concentration of 
multinational firms. Profit shifting appears to be partly operating through FDI 
flows. Such flows alter the cross-border allocation of investment and tax revenues 
(Skeie, 2016).
Investment in information and communication technology (ICT) and knowledge-
based capital (KBC) is an important driver of productivity growth. Many OECD 
countries lag behind in investment in ICT and KBC. Framework conditions 
including product and labour market regulations, access to venture capital and 
bankruptcy laws determine the return on investment in KBC. These framework 
conditions should not penalise failure (and risk taking) excessively and should 
allow a rapid reallocation of traditional labour and physical capital to maximise 
returns on investment in KBC. Public support including R&D tax incentives and 
direct support can boost private investment in KBC (Andrews and de Serres, 
2012; Andrews and Criscuolo, 2013; Westmore, 2013).
4 too much pRoDuct maRKet ReGulation can haRm investment
Less stringent product market regulations are often viewed as boosting invest-
ment. If the direct and indirect costs of starting a business are low, the number of 
business start-ups will increase. This in turn can translate into more investment. 
Similarly, pro-competitive product market regulation is likely to push firms to 
invest more to stay ahead of competitors or to allow the entry of new competitors 
willing to invest. Cutting red tape and administrative burdens reduces the costs 
related to capital stock adjustment. This could boost investment (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2005). More competition (up to a point) gives incentives to invest and 
innovate to stay ahead of competitors. It pushes for the adoption of better manage-
ment practices, encourages the investment in organisational, KBC and ICT capital 
(Fuentes Hutfilter et al., 2016). Therefore, public policies should strive to ease the 
regulatory burden on starting and running businesses. 
Difficulties in restructuring inefficient businesses may keep capital and labour in 
low-productivity firms and hence penalise investment. Capital trapped in ineffi-
cient firms is particularly relevant in Italy, Spain and Finland (Adalet McGowan, 
Andrews and Millot, 2017). Insolvency regimes are very important for the orderly 
exit of failing firms. The specific design matters for the efficient functioning of 
insolvency regimes (Adalet McGowan and Andrews, 2016). 
There is a negative link between foreign direct investment (FDI) and regulations 
aimed at FDI (Nicoletti et al., 2003; Fournier, 2015). Regulations applying to 
overall/domestic investment have more ambiguous effects. First, entry barriers to 
specific sectors are likely to discourage greenfield investment but they would 
encourage foreign investment in already existing firms, which have some market 
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102 increasing production costs can deter FDI in the export sector, as higher costs 
would make products less competitive internationally. But stringent regulations 
can boost the inflow of FDI in the production of goods and services for the domes-
tic market. Less restrictive regulations abroad and the resulting more efficient 
production structure of firms can give rise to a competitive edge over incumbent 
domestic firms bogged down by domestic regulation (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2005). For instance, reducing cross-country heterogeneity in regulation by 20% 
would boost FDI on average by about 15% (Fournier, 2015).
The impact of labour market regulation on investment is not straightorward. If 
capital and labour are complementary, more stringent labour market regulations 
will also have a negative effect on investment and hence capital deepening. But if 
capital and labour are subsitutes, stricter labour market regulations will boost 
investment as capital will substitute for labour. The influence of environmental 
policies on investment is also not very clear. More stringent environmental regula-
tions can trigger investment in more energy-efficient assets. On the other hand, 
tighter environmental regulations can reduce business investment though raising 
the costs of capital (Dlugosch and Kozluk, 2017).
Product and labour market regulations need to be coordinated. Even though it is 
easy to start a business, business dynamics may suffer if labour market regulations 
are binding (Zwart, 2016). Strict labour market regulations implying costly labour 
reallocation provides few incentives to invest in and experiment with new tech-
nologies (Fuentes-Hutfilter et al., 2016). Also, collective bargaining covering 
entire sectors can prohibit the entry of new firms as new entrants might pay lower 
wages than the incumbents (Arnold, 2017). 
5 hiGh ReGulatoRy unceRtainty is not helpful foR investment
The higher the uncertainty about the framework conditions, the higher the level of 
risk, the lower the incentives to invest. Regulatory uncertainty can have damaging 
effects on investment. Regulatory uncertainty arises if regulations are very com-
plex and difficult to interpret. But regulatory uncertainty also arises if there are 
frequent and unexpected changes in overall business conditions including admin-
istrative procedures involved in starting a business, taxation and product and 
labour market regulations (OECD, 2016). Designing and sticking to transparent 
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